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Abstract. This paper takes up the increasingly popular topic of drones – including unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and a vast panoply of com-
mercial drones and copters – to argue that our analysis should lie not so much on drones as objects, but as
assemblages of the vertical. Drones, I argue, constitute a socio-technical assemblage of the sky and vertical
space, which means that our focus should be not (only) on their technological development and capacities but
also on their effects and affects. The latter of these include increasing algorithmic data collection and circulation
that follow anticipatory logics.
1 Introduction
This paper takes up the increasingly popular topic of drones
– including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), small un-
manned aerial systems (sUAS), remotely piloted aircraft
(RPA), and a vast panoply of commercial drones and copters
– to argue that our analysis should lie not so much on drones
as technological objects, but as assemblages of the vertical.
Drones, I argue, constitute a socio-technical assemblage of
the sky and vertical space, which means that our focus should
be not (only) on their technological development and capac-
ities (important as that is) but (also) on their effects and af-
fects. In this way we can begin to conceptualize the political
life of objects. By framing the enquiry in this way I am able
to draw on the research agenda outlined by Klauser and Pe-
drozo (2015), who identify three major research objectives:
the making of drones (in this paper the drone market and its
attendant experts and knowledges); the functioning of drones
(here their colonization of the vertical); and the implications
of drones (here their place in an overall assemblage of algo-
rithmic governance).
The paper is divided into two main sections. Following a
brief elaboration and explanation of the main argument in-
troduced above, I posit that the vertical is undergoing an en-
closure and colonialization through the formation of a drone
market. This market is constantly being brought into forma-
tion, or performed and re-formed by actors, institutions, com-
mercial interests, and various knowledges by seeking to sur-
mount obstacles and tensions in its formation. Second, I ex-
amine the implications of the drone assemblage for the ways
in which it contributes to our increasingly algorithmic life.
Here we get further from drones as technological objects, and
closer to what they achieve – new forms of subjectivity and
governance, or what can be called “algorithmic governance”
after the Governing Algorithms conference (Musiani, 2013).
Following Gillespie, I take a broad view of algorithms as “en-
coded procedures for transforming input data into a desired
output, based on specified calculations” (Gillespie, 2014, p.
167). I conclude with a brief examination of the vulnerabil-
ities of drones, in particular hacking global positioning sys-
tem (GPS) and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capa-
bilities.
My deployment of the concept of the drone assemblage
draws from Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1987) on assem-
blage theory and the work of Foucault (2007) on governmen-
tality. Assemblage allows us to see that previously “discrete
surveillance systems [are converging] to the point that we can
speak of an emerging ‘surveillant assemblage”’ (Haggerty
and Ericson, 2000, p. 606). Their key point was that surveil-
lant assemblages abstract (Latin: abstractus, to draw away)
the data produced by an individual from that individual and
place it into circulation. Once in circulation these “data dou-
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bles” could be sold, and passed forward as variables for the
creation of profiles. As Leszczynski has put it:
Our movements, behaviors, and actions in,
through, and across space are easily and seam-
lessly digitally generated, captured, registered,
leaked, intercepted, transmitted, disclosed,
dis/assembled across data streams, and repurposed
by ourselves and others. Our personal spatial
data flows freely and without friction across and
between interoperable and synergistic geo-enabled
devices, platforms, services, applications, and
analytics engines (Leszczynski, 2016).
Haggerty and Ericson help us to think through what work
is done in the world by our objects of analysis, to understand
them in terms of a socio-technological “apparatus” rather
than merely a technical one, and to apprise them as contin-
uously forming (indeed performing), rather than remaining
static. Though it is more than surveillance that is at stake
with drones, rather surveillance, the drone market, and form
of governance constitute an assemblage.
Although the rich work of Deleuze and Guattari resists
summation, for our purposes we can use their well-known
definition of assemblage as “a multiplicity which is made up
of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons,
relations between them... [i]t is never filiations which are im-
portant but alliances, alloys” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987, p.
69). In other words, how do a wide variety of actors, insti-
tutions, and knowledges form and reform, and what work do
they do in the world? The components of an assemblage such
as that of the commercial drone have been brought together
deliberately and always benefits someone or something out-
side the assemblage. In one important, perhaps critical sense
then, the drone is an idea – one that is actively desired to
come into being (Buchanan, 2015). What is this idea; which
is to say, what affects does it have?
To address this question, I highlight two aspects of the
drone assemblage. First, they serve to control and modulate,
not by exercising an all-powerful sovereignty, but through a
marshalling of people’s behaviors and possible future behav-
iors, or what Foucault called “conduct of conduct” by which
people are led, but not compelled (Foucault, 1983, 2007).
Second, and not unrelated, drone assemblages are deployed
to reduce and contain threat. Although this might be most
obvious in the case of military or intelligence drones, my in-
terests lie with commercial or non-military drones. Here too
we may discern threat reduction although it takes different
forms, including the reduction of risk to capital flows by de-
creasing uncertainty in the market. By creating certain kinds
of vertical space (for example financial risk of investment in
the new technology) risk is ameliorated. Both these effects
are discussed in turn.
2 Enclosure of the vertical
As a number of authors have discussed, unmanned aircraft
have been around in various guises for about a 100 years
(Shaw, 2013). However, the market for drones beyond the
military is a more recent innovation. In this section I trace
the broad contours of this market and look at the key players
constituting it. My main argument is that the market is being
created on an ongoing basis, which we can call performing
markets (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Callon, 1998). This
does not reference how well markets are doing (under- or
over-performing) but rather that markets need to be continu-
ally created through the actions and relationships of various
material and non-material actors. Although I draw from ear-
lier work on performing markets, in partial distinction to this
literature, I argue that it is not so much the actors in elite posi-
tions (such as consulting economists and policy-makers) that
perform markets, but rather a set of interconnected players
that can take both a material and discursive form, who exist
at a variety of scales, and at a variety of positions.
This commercial drone assemblage is constituted not only
by drones themselves as technical objects, but also in the US
(my primary focus) by state and federal regulations (e.g., the
Federal Aviation Administration or FAA), specific knowl-
edges, drone manufacturers, regional Chambers of Com-
merce, members of the public, universities, the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), drone interest
groups, farmers, police, drone start-up companies, and lob-
byists. The target of the drone market is not only the produc-
tion of commercial drones, but regional development of the
sky itself.
At the moment the main sources of risk derive from uncer-
tainty about the legal, technical, and social implications of
investing in the commercial drone market. Federal regulators
such as the FAA in the USA have been charged with clar-
ifying commercial drone usage (i.e., loosening restrictions)
but this has put them in conflict with their core mission to
preserve safety. Overall the FAA has reacted too slowly ac-
cording to congressional testimony by Google and Facebook
(both of which have ongoing drone programs). Amazon,
which has received public attention for its proposal to deliver
packages, is also lobbying Congress for increased access to
the sky, doubling its lobbying spending to USD 9.4 million in
2015 (King, 2016).
Technologically there are also challenges but these seem
more certain of being solved (both DARPA and NASA have
announced early success in enabling drones to autonomously
avoid obstacles, drawing on research in ground-based self-
driving vehicles).
The size of the commercial drone market cannot be pre-
cisely determined, in part due to its rapidly changing form.
Some proxy measures are provided by various players such
as the lobbyist group Association of Unmanned Vehicle Sys-
tems International (AUVSI), but these are vested interests
and cannot be taken as impartial; nevertheless, they are in-
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dicative of what people expect or hope the market to be. AU-
VSI’s economic analysis (Jenkins and Vasigh, 2013) states
that more than 70 000 jobs will be created in the USA, with
an economic impact of USD 13.6 billion. A recent overview
of commercial drone market’s size found estimates ranging
from USD 125 million to USD 5.1 billion by 2019, indicat-
ing the still-emerging nature of the market (Oppenheimer
& Co., 2016). By comparison, the US military UAV budget
is only USD 3.95 billion for financial year (FY) 2017 (Get-
tinger, 2016). The FAA’s drone registration program has been
so successful that there are already more registered drone
operators (325 000) than manned aircraft (Associated Press,
2016).
AUVSI’s claim is an example of how various components
of the drone market are performing the market – in this case
framing the expectations, which leads to pressure on the FAA
to adjust its policies to enable the creation of these jobs, for
companies to enter the market in expectation of realizing re-
turns, of chambers of commerce to seek regional investment,
and so on.
This performativity of the drone market is reflective of
what Anderson has called “anticipatory action” whereby pre-
emption, preparation, and prevention of threats to neoliberal
life are enacted in anticipation of future conditions and ge-
ographies (Anderson, 2010). In this case AUVSI anticipates
a vast future economic market that would extend neoliberal
capital into a new regional development of the sky, but it is
one that will not come about unless various blockages and
threats are identified and removed. AUVSI’s ultimate intent
in issuing the economic forecast is not so much to estimate
market size, as to preempt obstacles to it.
Non-military drone operation in the USA occurs in one of
two categories: public and civil (including commercial). In
the former, which includes federal, state, and local govern-
ment including law enforcement and universities, the FAA
will provide airspace authorization through Public Certifi-
cates of Waiver of Authorization (COA). According to the
FAA, the review process for a COA is about 60–90 days. In
the latter, the FAA issues a civil COA for airspace permission
and certifies the equipment used through a so-called Section
333 exemption. The latter takes about 120 days for the ap-
proval process, and derives from Section 333 of the 2012
FMRA. This section grants authority to the Department of
Transportation (including the FAA) to issue exemptions on
a case by case basis. Since the first exemption in September
2014 through to May 2016, more than 5000 exemptions have
been issued, with a further 17 000 in the queue. (These may
cover multiple uses and units.)
Interestingly, 333 exemptions were initially highly con-
strained geographically because the applicant also had to ap-
ply for a COA in a specific airspace. In March 2015, the FAA
allowed drone operators to fly in any permitted geographic
airspace. This has encouraged a lot of start-up companies,
who are taking a drone for hire business model, i.e., a new
form of business not permitted under the original regulations.
Figure 1. Intended primary operations categories of small drones
in the USA. Source: Michel and Gettinger (2016).
What do drones do? Commercial drones are flown for a
variety of purposes. According to the Center for Study of
the Drone, which has tabulated 2733 Section 333 exemptions
through the end of 2015, the most common intended usage of
small drones was for photo/film purposes (29 %), followed
by real estate (18.2 %). See Fig. 1.
The survey noted, however, that applicants intended to use
their drones for multiple purposes (on average about two
purposes per exemption). Thus, an applicant may state that
the intended purpose is to collect aerial footage for moni-
toring utility infrastructure. This appears to be a way that the
FAA can loosen its requirements because one application can
now cover different drones and different uses. Additionally,
the one big increase in intended use is emergency services,
which grew from 3 to 19 % from the start to the end of the
survey period. Because these exemptions do not include civil
uses provided by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) it is in-
teresting to note that these companies anticipate their drones
being hired for security and emergency services. Indeed, cur-
rently, fewer than 50 police departments operate drones (US
Congressional Research Service, 2016).
A second area of tension lies between federal and state
regulations. Some states have attempted to pass their own
UAS regulations either permitting or more frequently ban-
ning drones from certain activities such as flying close to
properties in order to protect privacy. However, the FAA
continues to assert that it possesses exclusive sovereignty of
airspace and that it can preempt local and state requirements.
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A third area of concern for the drone market lobbyists is
how drones are perceived and understood, or what might
be called the affective politics of drones. This has two el-
ements – negating concerns that commercial drones are a
threat to well-being (primarily issues of privacy and safety),
and controlling the narrative (e.g., in the media or legisla-
tures) by promoting their beneficial potential. Drone regis-
tration addresses the first of these by requiring an identifying
mark on each drone, to enable monitoring and enforcement
of UAS regulations. Similarly, geofencing technologies are
increasingly written into control software to disable drone
operations in specific spaces (say within 5 miles of an air-
port) and are now used by drone companies as a competi-
tive advantage for safety. For example, DJI touts its geofenc-
ing, known as Geospatial Environment Online (GEO), as
the best-in-class geospatial information system that provides
drone operators with information that will help them make
smart decisions about where and when to fly. It combines
up-to-date airspace information, and a warning and flight-
restriction system (DJI, 2015).
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) a
whole raft of other technologies for detecting drones in flight
and even destroying them are in development (US Congres-
sional Research Service, 2016). But as a source in govern-
ment told us “ultimately, even once the FAA makes its deci-
sions, the shape and size of this industry is going to be deter-
mined by the insurers” (interview, November 2014).
Industry stakeholders have expressed frustration at the de-
lays, and have pushed back against privacy concerns. In an
interview, the Director of UAVSI, Michael Toscano, stated
that drones did not represent a new threat to privacy: “It does
not make a difference how you collect [information]. ... I do
not think privacy is really the issue. ... The issue is safety”
(Toscano Interview, November 2014).1 In this way, Toscano
seeks to shift the debate from a contentious policy issue (pri-
vacy) to a solvable technical issue.
Industry has also proposed safety solutions. Amazon’s
drone program, known as Prime Air, has proposed a new
subdivision of the sky to allow for small UAS operations. In
their scheme, heights between ground level and 200 ft would
be dedicated to hobbyist flying drones and kites, heights be-
tween 200 and 400 ft would be a dedicated “drone lane” to
be used by small fast UAS, the zone between 400 and 500 ft
will be a no-fly zone, and heights above 500 ft would be re-
served for other aircraft as is the current case (Amazon Prime
Air, 2015). However, the FAA has so far taken a dim view of
this proposal, stating this is “segmentation” rather than “in-
tegration” of airspace (US Federal Aviation Administration,
2015).
Google announced in late 2015 that they expect to start
drone deliveries by 2017. David Vos, who runs Project Wing,
was quoted in the media as stating that “we are pretty much
1Interviews cited in this paper were carried out by the author and
Dr. Susan Roberts, University of Kentucky.
on a campaign here”, and that they would like to see a
new class of airspace, Class G, created especially for drones
(Morgan, 2015), similar to the Amazon proposal. To this end,
one of the six FAA test sites includes a component in Ice-
land, where approvals can be obtained in as few as 10 days
(US Congressional Research Service, 2015). According to
Forbes, Amazon is also scanning private properties in high
resolution, which may indicate it is developing its automated
sense-and-avoid capabilities (Mac, 2015). The FAA has also
responded to industry pressure to accommodate its line-of-
sight restriction by announcing a new program, known as the
Pathfinder Program, which would work with companies on
a test basis to develop beyond line-of-sight capabilities (Mc-
Farland, 2015). But the proposal of a new class of airspace
has not been received favorably by the FAA, which sees it as
an infringement on its core mission, and is waiting for new
technologies that can track and manage drones flying below
500 ft. For example, NASA is developing a low-altitude UAS
traffic management (UTM) system, which it will turn over to
the FAA in 2019 (Carey, 2016).
There is also pressure from competition abroad. Many
countries around the globe have programs and processes
that allow far more UAS activity than in the USA. Japan,
for example, has permitted UAS use in agriculture since
the 1980s. In Europe, the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) has sought regulations for UASs that would inte-
grate them into national airspace by forming three categories
of use (open, specific, and certified). The latter category
would allow beyond line-of-sight operations (US Govern-
ment Accountability Office, 2015). By contrast, the USA has
announced further regulation, requiring that some publicly
available drones be registered to their owners (Associated
Press, 2015). As a source in the US government explained:
“you are seeing already the emergence of significant mar-
kets for small commercial UAVs overseas... but until there
is a market for it [in the US], no one can move out of their
garage” (Interview, November 2014).
All of these developments raise the question of what is
happening to the vertical. It has been long established that
the sky is public – otherwise each airplane would have to get
permission to fly over your property.2 This is akin to the con-
cept of international waters on the ocean. But as with interna-
tional waters, this public space is becoming increasingly and
deliberately enclosed, in what might constitute a modern “en-
closure of the commons”. (China, for example, has recently
built on low-lying islands in the Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea, and claimed not just sovereignty over the seas,
2See US v. Causby 1946 (328 U.S. 256), which held that the
doctrine of ad coelom (that is, property rights up to the sky) was
not relevant to the modern world, and that airspace above a certain
minimum was the public domain. On the other hand, property own-
ers have some air rights in connection with their property, although
they cannot dictate what flies there since that is the sovereign right
of the USA (i.e., the FAA).
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but over the airspace as well.) As Don Mitchell has argued,
when space is taken from the public domain and privatized
(enclosed):
The threat here is not from the disorderly behav-
iors... but rather from the steady erosion of the
ideal of the public, of the collective, and the steady
promotion of private, rather than democratic, con-
trol of space (Mitchell, 2004, p. 137).
How is this occurring in the drone context? Is it possible
to privatize the sky and effectively overturn US v. Causby? It
is already happening incrementally. Some companies have
sought and received special FAA dispensations to control
airspace over their businesses. Airspace over Disney theme
parks for example is restricted up to 3000 ft, with the FAA
categorizing this zone as national defense airspace. Some pri-
vate entities (such as ski resorts) have also banned drones
(US Congressional Research Service, 2016). This raises the
very issue, however, of their legal right to do so, given that
the FAA controls all airspace (especially if the operator is
outside the property). Similarly, activist groups sometimes
fly drones over mountaintop removal (MTR) mining sites, al-
though this (and indeed government overflights) is strongly
objected to by the coal industry. There are also numerous
FAA restrictions, known as NOTAMs (notices to airmen),
such as one restricting drones from flying within 15 mi of
Washington D.C. Reagan National Airport, 3 times the usual
distance.
Not all airspace privatization occurs because of drones.
The proliferation of POPS or privately owned public spaces
(including malls but also many parks, buildings, and river-
fronts) and the UK’s recent introduction of PSPOs (public
space protection orders) are steadily eating away at public ac-
cess through privatization. (PSPOs are similar to ASBOs or
antisocial behavior orders, and criminalize activity in public
space that is not normally a crime.) According to one author,
PSPOs act as “spatial control orders... making predefined ac-
tivities within a mapped area prosecutable” (Garrett, 2015).
As authorities seek to further conduct behaviors in nomi-
nally public spaces, drones can provide an additional form
of surveillance for areas not already covered by CCTV, or
where a mobile aerial viewpoint is needed. Although PSPOs
are horizontal, ground level spaces, there is also a vertical di-
mension. Air rights – the space immediately above a property
– can be sold separately from the building itself, and although
these do not extend indefinitely into the sky, it is nevertheless
a “hot market,” with its own brokers and traders. In some
places, the price can be as high as USD 230 per square foot
of air (Herships, 2013).
Drone assemblages and the marketplace are thus actively
performed by various interested actors in very material and
discursive ways. I argue that the drone market will continue
to develop by extending this control and enclosure of the ver-
tical (i.e., through increasing privatization and monetization
of the sky). In the next section, I offer some reflections on the
effects of this market in terms of governance.
3 Algorithmic governance
In this paper, algorithmic governance refers to the manifold
ways that algorithms and code/space enable practices of gov-
ernance by conducting and mediating behavior. I am particu-
larly interested in the manner this occurs in geographic con-
texts. I therefore broaden my view of the drone assemblage
to see it as only part of a set of developments that I call “al-
gorithmic governance”. Here we get furthest from drones as
objects but closest to what effects they achieve through the
creation of new forms of subjectivity. These new subjectiv-
ities have the purpose of identifying and containing threat,
through various mechanisms of control, and have geograph-
ical outcomes. I take an expansive view of threat, to include,
like Anderson (2010), threats to profitable neoliberal activi-
ties.
What is algorithmic governance? As stated above, an al-
gorithm is any form of calculation that takes input and yields
desired output. They are increasingly essential because of the
vast amounts of data being produced – big data – that out-
pace human computational capacities. The output I am con-
cerned with is modulated (affected) conduct, or what Fou-
cault calls the “conduct of conduct”. Thus an algorithm is
data plus calculation is equal to conduct of conduct. Algo-
rithmic governance is therefore the increasing prevalence of
algorithmically derived decisions made on the basis of per-
sonally identifiable information (PII), data profiles that may
or may not say something meaningful about your life, but act
to form spaces of possibility, whether you are aware of them
or not. For example, algorithms may impact your chances of
employment (or keeping employment), getting credit and ed-
ucation, health services, travel, and basic control over online
information about you (Pasquale, 2015).
For what reasons are behavior, attitudes, and beliefs af-
fected (conducted)? For Amoore (2014), the various assem-
blages of big data, everywhere sensors, and algorithms “are
less interested in who a suspect might be than in what a future
suspect may become” (Amoore, 2014, p. 109). Algorithms
are therefore directed at producing certain kinds of subjects
(the proto-suspect) in order to reduce, allay or redirect risk.
Nguyen for example, provides a case study of how algorith-
mic biometrics in US schools modulate spatial behavior. The
biometric devices “not only verify identity; they also shape
how, where, and for what purposes authorized school bodies
can move” (Nguyen, 2015, p. 2).
In the drone context the most obvious example (beyond
the military) is the use of drones for policing. Indeed, Neo-
cleous goes so far as to argue that air power is police power
(Neocleous, 2013). For example, Aeryon Labs, a Canadian
manufacturer of small drones has partnered with Microsoft
to produce real-time aerial imagery for police and intelli-
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gence surveillance. Known as the Microsoft Advanced Pa-
trol Platform (MAPP) the system is aimed at police depart-
ments around the country, and “law enforcement and secu-
rity personnel” (Microsoft, 2015). Similarly, Nigeria just an-
nounced the use of drones to supplement the 1000 CCTVs
(closed circuit TVs) it has in place across the city of La-
gos, as part of a crime prevention initiative (Akinola, 2015).
Some US states have also passed laws allowing drones to be
equipped with tasers and other “non-lethal” weaponry (della
Cava, 2015). But perhaps the most notable usage has been by
the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), which has flown
unarmed drones (Predator B) since 2004, and currently oper-
ates 10 drones. According to a government report, however,
this program has yet to prove its value, and recommended
that CBP cancel its plans to spend USD 443 million on 14
additional drones (US Department of Homeland Security,
2015). Although the CBP agreed officially with the report,
they were later quoted in the media as strongly disagreeing.
The CBP assistant commissioner in charge of acquisitions,
Mark Borkowski, stated “there are a zillion things” drones
can do, and that the value of the drugs they had interdicted
outweighed the cost of the program (Ortega, 2015).
What is important to note here is that this affect is oper-
ating on data. Amoore (2014) calls these the “data deriva-
tives” and they are increasingly uncoupled from underly-
ing values associated with a living person. As several au-
thors have noted, such derivatives were postulated during the
1980s by Deleuze, who proposed the concept of the “divid-
ual” (Deleuze, 1992).
It is worth pausing to explicate this notion of the dividual.
If for Foucault the period of modernism up to the early twen-
tieth century was marked by the so-called disciplinary soci-
eties, then Deleuze argues that the current moment is better
understood as societies of control. Discipline has too heavy
a hand, as Foucault himself recognized through his own dis-
cussion of governmentality as management and conduct of
conduct. With societies of control it is more a matter of mod-
ulating, of continually adapting and affecting, than enclos-
ing people in institutions such as prisons (Foucault, 1977).
Deleuze observes “The disciplinary societies have two poles:
the signature that designates the individual, and the number
or administrative numeration that indicates his or her posi-
tion within a mass” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 5). This is a very in-
teresting observation because it comports with a recent his-
tory of data that identified three time periods: the nineteenth
century, the period up to WWII, and the period since about
the late 1970s to the present (Bouk, 2016). During the nine-
teenth century the focus was on collecting personal data in
order to fit them into biopolitical populations – this was after
all the century of the Census, and the Census atlas (Hannah,
2000). During the next period, starting from the first couple
of decades of the twentieth century, personal data collection
is marked by a practice of mass production, mass consump-
tion, mass marketing, etc., or in other words a proliferation
of massification (in pursuit, no doubt, of mass profit, though
Bouk does not say this directly). The primary purpose here
was to fit the individual into the mass, through for exam-
ple, sorting and prediction achieved by ever-more metrics
in testing. In education alone we could cite in the USA the
Educational Testing Service (ETS), GRE scores to get into
graduate school, the h-index for individuals, journal impact
factors, and a whole array of student performance metrics.
In the current moment, which Bouk dates from the 1970s
(or about the time that productivity increases come adrift
from wage increases, linked to the increasing computeriza-
tion and robotization of the work place), the rise of the “data
double” takes place. Analogous to Amoore’s data derivatives
and coined by Haggerty and Ericson (2000), the data dou-
ble feeds big data and the internet of things (IoT). The data
abstracted from individuals becomes commoditized, and not
surprisingly has a metric, the ARPU or average revenue per
user. For a company such as Facebook, the ARPU can be as
high as USD 9.30 in North America, and over USD 2 glob-
ally. One of the controversies over social media is that none
of this revenue is currently returned to Facebook’s 1.5 billion
users.
In addition to monetization, however, data doubles and big
data lead to policy outcomes – what some have called com-
putational politics. This is not a new dream of course, as the
post-war work by scientists such as John von Neumann on
“cybernetics” evidences (etymologically, cyber means con-
trol or governance). As long ago as the early 1970s for ex-
ample, Allende’s Chile was the site of a radical experiment in
governing the economy of a nation through a central control
room, in project CyberSyn (Medina, 2011). Data doubles in
our era could thus be understood in political economic terms.
Deleuze’s dividual is neither an individual (especially not
a unitary self) nor an aggregate. Instead, the dividual is made
up, perhaps even assembled, of strands that keep coming to-
gether and apart, and can divided and redivided (Delueze
also calls this the nomadic subject, rather than the traditional
monadic subject). A consequence of this is that data doubles
can circulate around in many ways not necessarily follow-
ing predetermined paths, a question of networks rather than
centers, of relays. Deleuze’s relays, I suggest, should not be
thought of simply as automatically passing forward the infor-
mation. Rather, he importantly notes that “what is important
is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the
code is a password” (p. 5). Later he adds
Felix Guattari has imagined a city where one
would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s
street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (divid-
ual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but
the card could just as easily be rejected on a given
day or between certain hours; what counts is not
the barrier but the computer that tracks each per-
son’s position – licit or illicit – and effects a uni-
versal modulation (Deleuze, 1992, p. 7).
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Here Deleuze speaks to how our movement and behav-
iors are modulated (i.e., not disciplined, but affected) by
codes and passwords. But how would this work with drones?
Would we be aware that it is happening?
Drones have the capacity to extend the surveillant state
further into what has been called code/space (Kitchin and
Dodge, 2011). These are capacities that can digitally surveill,
and include biometrics, automatic facial recognition, and lo-
cation tracking. The media has already reported that planes
with cameras were flown over the Ferguson and Baltimore
protests in the USA, and that police departments have ac-
cess to a database of over 2 billion scans of vehicle license
plate records with locations (Jouvenal, 2016) collected via
ANPR (automated number plate recognition). These help
locate, identify, and assess potential suspects, which, cou-
pled with other technology that ingests social media post-
ings and other public data, creates an actionable threat score.
Drones are likely to add to this monitoring, especially as the
Supreme Court has held that warrants are not required for
aerial observation in public airspace (see Florida v. Riley,
488 US 445 (1989)).3 Drones would be most useful to police
as cheaper alternatives to mobile or temporary events, such as
marathons, or to monitor temporarily regulated spaces such
as PSPOs in the UK.
Depending on the legislative landscape, police may also
be able to deploy automated facial recognition technologies
with drones. This capability already exists. In 2011 biomet-
rics company Progeny Systems Corporation won a contract
from the US Army for drone-based automated facial recog-
nition, and is only one of several companies working on
this issue. An advantage to this form of surveillance is that
a drone could autonomously decide, depending on its algo-
rithmic programming, to track an individual through public
spaces. Similar to the advent of predictive policing one need
not be aware of this monitoring, nor have given consent. For
example, in Illinois the Biometric Information Privacy Act,
passed in 2008 prohibits the collection of biometric informa-
tion without prior consent (including retina scans, face ge-
ometry, voiceprint, and fingerprints). Under its terms, class-
action lawsuits have been filed against Google, Snapchat, and
Facebook. It is apparent that drone-based tracking based on
facial geometries would be regulated by such a law, and so
the police dream of flying drones above crowds for purposes
of recognition would be problematized. In 2016, Illinois leg-
islators proposed amendments to the law that would severely
curtail its remit, and which would doubtless allow drone-
based biometric identification (Brandon, 2016).
Current advances in technology allow faces to be detected
at an angle even when partially occluded, and can be used to
train neural networks (Farfade et al., 2015). One Australian
company, Imagus, claims to reliably detect and identify fa-
3However, note that this ruling only applied to naked eye ob-
servation. Additionally, many state legislatures are crafting drone-
related legislation that would require warrants (McNeal, 2016).
cial images in non-cooperative environments (e.g., in low
light, face partially obscured, or without the subject’s per-
mission). This need not be limited to subject identification
(matching a face to an identity). For example, Imagus of-
fer a facial matching service, whereby a subject is tracked as
they go from one point to another, such as at an airport termi-
nal. The marketing industry has started contemplating how to
use automated facial recognition for delivery of advertising.
While current geofencing-based advertising is susceptible to
being circumvented (e.g., turning off location in your mobile
device), you cannot “turn off [your] face” as one marketer
put it (Warnock, 2015).
4 Drone vulnerability?
Throughout the development of drones and especially their
proliferation into domestic airspace there have been attendant
anxieties over their failure, misuse, or dangers. In this last
section, I wish to discuss some of the many vulnerabilities of
drones. As the vertical is colonized therefore it is recognized
that it is yet another domain where risks proliferate.
Technologically, the fact that many drones rely on Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the US GPS,
the Russian GLONASS (Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sput-
nikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System) or
European Galileo system is an exploitable vulnerability. This
was brought starkly to light after the capture in 2011 of an
American RQ-170 “Sentinel” UAV by Iran, when concern
was raised about GPS/GNSS spoofing attacks. (Whether the
RQ-170 was spoofed by GPS is uncertain, but such attacks
are feasible because civil GPS signals are relatively weak and
unencrypted.) GPS are also problematic because signals can-
not travel underwater (and therefore cannot be used for am-
phibious UAVs) nor pass through buildings, urban canyons or
underground. GPS spoofing has been demonstrated to work
in several settings. In testimony before Congress, an engi-
neering professor noted that he had successfully spoofed
GPS in both the laboratory and in the field at White Sands
Missile Test Range (Kerns et al., 2014; Humphreys, 2015).
In 2015, at DEFCON 23, the annual hacker convention, two
Chinese researchers demonstrated an inexpensive build your
own GPS spoofer to trick a popular model of consumer drone
(a DJI Phantom) to override its geofencing so that it would
operate in a no-fly zone or appear to be in Tibet (Huang and
Yang, 2015).
In that light, DARPA initiated a research project in 2015
to find alternatives to GPS. While this may involve solutions
that improve inertial guidance, or distance measurement,
DARPA is especially interested in alternative sources to GPS,
such as from “television, radio and cell towers, satellites,
as well as natural phenomena such as lightening” (DARPA,
2015). DARPA’s program to develop an alternative to GPS,
known as Spatial, Temporal, and Orientation Information
in Contested Environments (STOIC), made its first awards
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to military contractors in 2015 (Raytheon BBN Technolo-
gies, Expedition Technology and Rockwell Collins). How-
ever, these technologies are still several years away, espe-
cially for commercial or civil drones.
The other major technological challenge lies in automatic
sense-and-avoid (SAA) and line-of-sight requirements estab-
lished by the FAA. The first of these requires the devel-
opment of technical capability for drones to perform semi-
autonomously when faced with physical obstacles (build-
ings, birds, and other aircraft including drones). For example,
a drone can be programmed to follow a specific route from
location to location, but like a self-driving car, would need to
be able to detect (sense) intervening obstacles that may occur
and successfully avoid them. (DARPA announced some early
successes of SAA in early 2016.) Line of sight refers to the
FAA requirement that (currently) all UASs must be kept in
direct visual line of sight of a qualified operator (i.e., without
using First Person Viewpoint (FPV) or sighting aids such as
binoculars). Other prescriptions include no-fly zones within
5 miles of an airport or helipad, that drones weigh no more
than 55 lbs., and that they not fly at night or over stadiums
during games (the latter is covered by what the FAA calls a
Temporary Flight Restriction, TFR).
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have introduced and analyzed the emerg-
ing market for commercial drones. I have done so by un-
derstanding drones not just as a technology, but as a socio-
technological assemblage. By this I do not mean to diminish
the real material constituents of drones, such as their phys-
ical capacities (surveillance, package delivery, or real estate
inspection) and technological weaknesses (sense-and-avoid).
In fact, these remain key areas for further research as they are
doubtlessly tied to legal, political, and social mediation of
commercial drones. The advantage of understanding drones
as assemblage, however, is that we can begin to conceptu-
alize the political life of objects. In conclusion therefore, I
identify three areas where research can contribute to our un-
derstanding of commercially and civically available drones;
their role in biometric identification, their affective politics,
and the datafication of subjectivities.
Although perhaps an unfamiliar research domain for social
scientists and geographers, drone-based mobile automated
facial detection, recognition, and tracking are likely to have
profound effects on people’s sense of place and navigational
possibilities. In particular, I would underline the arguments
made by Virginia Eubanks that digital technologies are a do-
main of social justice, and that the future of surveillance is
often discernible first among poor communities (Eubanks,
2014). As Klauser and Pedrozo (2015) pointed out, commer-
cial drone usage “is sporadic and punctual rather than well-
ordered and sequential or systematic” (p. 287) and it may be
that we have to adapt our notion of surveillance as panoptic
to something more geographically specific.
In that context, it is important to be attentive to the ways
these algorithms operate. According to recent studies, algo-
rithmic biometrics exhibit demonstrable racial bias (Angwin
et al., 2016; Klare et al., 2012). In one case, an algorithm in
use in police departments in multiple US states failed twice
as often with African American subjects as with Caucasian
subjects (Klare et al., 2012). Facial detection, tracking and
recognition is fast becoming a significant factor in security
discourses. One recent study for example sought to identify
the most typical types of faces in different geographical ar-
eas (Islam et al., 2015). It would be important to further study
how drone-enabled facial recognition could then identify in-
dividuals who were “out of place” in certain situations. In
general, there has been little work on the effects of facial
recognition, and its likely deployment from drones.
Second, much more work is needed on what might be
called the affective politics of drones. To date, only one
(controversially received) study has been performed on what
feelings are identifiable from “living under drones” (Inter-
national Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Center and
Global Justice Clinic, 2012). Do drones alter one’s sense
of self, especially around privacy? In what ways? There is
a critical need to understand the specific ways algorithms
and other forms of code – such as smart cities/technologies,
the IoT and machine-based learning – have so successfully
arisen to challenge, supplement, and, at times, replace human
decision-making. What are the ethics of transferring so much
decision-making to machines that used to be carried out by
humans? What are the affective politics of the proliferation
of metrics in neoliberal government, and considering their
vulnerabilities how does the “fickle affectivity of statist en-
counters” play out with regards to drones (Woodward, 2014,
p. 23)?
The datafication of subjectivities, for example what John
Cheney-Lippold (2011) calls the “soft biopolitics” of algo-
rithmic citizenship, is no doubt a prime target of value ex-
traction. This value may be economic and we do need further
studies of the drone market, who is contributing to it, and
how particular ways of valuation are arising. But we also see
an investment in what Shaw and Akhter (2014) calls “algo-
rithmic technics” of constant capital (batons, body cameras,
police dogs, facial recognition, drones) and a disinvestment
in variable capital (the human). Further work on the drone
market and the forms of subjectivity it is instituting is criti-
cally important here.
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